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Abstract
Category, or property generalization is a central function in human
cognition. It plays a crucial role in a variety of domains, such as learning,
everyday reasoning, specialized reasoning, and decision making. Judging
the content of a dish as edible, a hormone level as healthy, a building as
belonging to the same architectural style as previously seen buildings, are
examples of category generalization. In this paper, we propose
self-organizing maps as candidates to explain the psychological mechanisms
underlying category generalization. Self-organizing maps are psychologically
and biologically plausible neural network models that learn after limited
exposure to positive category examples, without any need of contrastive
information. Just like humans. They reproduce human behavior in category
generalization, in particular for what concerns the well-known Numerosity
and Variability effects, which are usually explained with Bayesian tools.
Where category generalization is concerned, self-organizing maps are good
candidates to bridge the gap between the computational level of analysis in
Marr’s hierarchy (where Bayesian models are situated) and the algorithmic
level of analysis in which plausible mechanisms are described.
Keywords: category generalization, self-organizing maps, connectionist
modeling, Bayesian models
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Self-organizing maps and generalization: an algorithmic description of
Numerosity and Variability effects
Introduction
Category generalization is a central function in human cognition that
plays a crucial role in a variety of domains, such as learning, everyday
reasoning, specialized reasoning, decision making. Judging the content of a
dish as edible, a hormone level as healthy, a new building as belonging to
the same architectural style than previously seen ones, are examples of
category generalization.
More formally, category generalization can be stated as follows.
Starting from the observation that an object x belongs to a category C, or
that x has the property P , how do we generalize C, or P , to objects other
than x? As Shepard suggests: ‘Because any object or situation experienced
by an individual is unlikely to recur in exactly the same form and context,
psychology’s first general law should be a law of generalization’ (Shepard,
1987), p.1317.
Historically, probabilistic (Shepard, 1987; Anderson, 1991;
Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001), and similarity-based (Tversky, 1977;
Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) accounts of generalization have
faced each other: the former suggesting that our generalization judgements
are based on probabilistic reasoning, the latter suggesting that indeed we
base our generalization judgements on an evaluation of similarity between
stimuli. So, for instance, according to the probabilistic account, the
doctor’s judgment on whether a new hormone level is healthy, similarly to a
previously observed one, is based on a set of considerations involving the
attribution of a probability to each possible range of values corresponding
to healthy hormone levels, which in turn takes into account the likelyhood
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of encountering the observed examples of healthy hormone levels if that was
indeed the correct range of possible hormone values. In contrast, according
to the similarity-based approach, the doctor’s judgement on whether a new
hormone level is healthy is based on a completely different set of
considerations based on the similarity of the new hormone level with
respect to a previously built representation (whether prototypical or
exemplar-based or based on a pattern of neuron activations) of the category
of healthy hormone levels. In the same family as similarity-based accounts
can also be put the neural network accounts, in which generalization
properties emerge from experience: a correctly trained network will map a
new stimulus to the category associated to the set of stimuli which are
maximally similar to it (Gluck and Bower, 1988; Kruschke, 1992; Mareschal
and French, 2000; McClelland and Rogers, 2003; Gureckis and Love, 2004;
Krizhevsky et al., 2012).
In this paper we demonstrate that a specific kind of neural network,
namely the self-organizing maps (SOMs for short) proposed by Kohonen
(1982) can model human’s generalization performance in a biologically and
psychologically plausible manner. Unlike more traditional neural network
models, SOMs reflect basic constraints of a plausible brain implementation.
SOMs learn in an unsupervised fashion, i.e. by autonomously discovering
relevant regularities in the training set, instead of requiring supervisory
feedback needed in many other neural network models. They can learn
from very few examples and training cycles, and without the need of
negative examples or contrastive information, thus overcoming one of the
main criticisms raised against neural network approaches (Gliozzi et al.,
2009). Last, SOMs exhibit topological organization, in which similar stimuli
are processed by close-by areas of the map, similarly to what happens in
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brain cortical areas (Kohonen et al., 2001; Miikkulainen et al., 2005). SOMs
have proven to be successful models of category formation, capable of
explaining experimental results, as well as of making novel and
experimentally confirmed predictions (Schyns, 1991; Miikkulainen et al.,
2005; Li et al., 2007; Gliozzi et al., 2009; Mayor and Plunkett, 2010). In
this paper we show that SOMs are adequate at reproducing two effects
described by Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001), when they extend Shepard
(1987)’s universal law of generalization. Shepard describes an exponential
decay in humans’ inclination to consider a new stimulus as belonging to the
same category as a previously considered one. The decay is proportional to
the distance between the new stimulus and the examples already observed.
Tenenbaum & Griffiths extend Shepard’s analysis to the case where the
examples already observed are multiple. In this case, our inclination to
generalize, and consider a new stimulus as belonging to the same category
as the previously observed examples still decreases in an exponential
manner when the distance between the new stimulus and the previously
observed examples increases. This is affected by:
• the Numerosity Effect: the more examples of a category observed
within a given range, the lower the generalization outside that range;
• the Variability Effect: the higher the variability in the set of observed
examples of a category, the higher the generalization outside the
examples’ range.
We will show that SOMs exhibit both Numerosity and Variability
Effects. Intuitively, the explanation of these effects lies in the fact that
Numerosity augments the accuracy of category representation, with a
consequent decrease in category generalization, whereas Variability
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decreases the accuracy of category representation, increasing the distance
between the examples and the category representation, with a consequent
increase in category generalization.
To date, these effects are considered one of the main motivations
supporting Bayesian analyses of category generalization, since Bayesian
methods explain these phenomena in a very elegant way. It is also argued
that alternative theories of categorization (ranging from exemplar and
prototype theories to backpropagation-based neural networks) can not
account for the same phenomena. Whence the conclusion that Bayesian
models are best suited to explain category generalization (Tenenbaum and
Griffiths, 2001).
However, Bayesian models of cognition are formulated at Marr’s
computational level of analysis, and therefore describe what an optimal
solution to the problem of generalization would be. They do not describe a
mechanism by which this solution could be found by a finite human, with
limited capacities.
In this paper we show that, in contrast to the above claim, the same
phenomena can be accounted for by SOMs, that embody notions such as
representation and stimulus similarity that are well-established within the
cognitive science literature, and that lie at the ‘algorithmic’ level in Marr
(1982)’s hierarchy. This explanation therefore provides an account of the
psychologically plausible mechanisms underlying categorization, and
category generalization judgements, which is lacking in Bayesian analyses of
category generalization.
Establishing these mechanisms, and in general a bridge between
Marr’s different levels of analysis, is recognized as a key challenge by
Bayesian cognitive scientists themselves, who have proposed some
SOMS AND BAYES 7
mechanisms that approximate Bayesian reasoning (Sanborn et al., 2010; Shi
et al., 2010; Sanborn and Chater, 2016). The main problem of these
proposed mechanisms is that they lack psychological plausibility, as we will
discuss later. Given the promising results reported in this paper, we suggest
that SOMs may be good candidates for describing psychologically plausible
mechanisms that approximate Bayesian models of category generalization
and of other related cognitive tasks. Even if understanding the precise
relations between SOMs and Bayesian models needs further investigation,
as it will become clear in the Discussion.
Bayesian analyses of category generalization
In contrast to more traditional models of cognition, which describe
the psychological processes underlying cognitive abilities, Bayesian models
of cognition are formulated at Marr (1982)’s level of ‘computational theory’.
This means that in Bayesian models cognitive tasks are described as
computational problems posed by the environment. Humans are assumed
to find optimal solutions to these problems using inductive, probabilistic
inference. By probabilistic inference, given some limited data, humans find
the best possible hypothesis compatible with the evidence.
The problem of generalizing a category C to a new object y is
formulated in this context as the problem of estimating the probability that
y belongs to C, after observing X examples of C (Shepard, 1987;
Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001)1. This goes through two steps. First, the
posterior probability p(h|X) is computed by the Bayes Rule for all possible
extensions h of C, where a possible extension is any consequential region,
1Shepard (1987) considers the case in which there is one single category example,
whereas Tenenbaum & Griffiths (2001) extend the approach to multiple examples. In this
paper we refer to Tenenbaum & Griffiths (2001)’s theory.
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also called hypothesis. The Bayes Rule uses both priors and likelihoods.
Each hypothesis h in the space of hypotheses H has a prior probability
p(h), independent from any observed example. Then there is the likelihood
p(X|h) of observing the examples X if the true extension of the category
was indeed h. The likelihood obeys the size principle: the smaller the size
|h| of the consequential region h including all elements of X, the higher the
probability of sampling all elements of X as examples of C, and therefore
the higher the likelihood.
If X = {xi} (with 1 ≤ i ≤ n), then
p(X|h) =

1
|h|n if x1 . . . xn ∈ h;
0 otherwise.
(1)
The priors and likelihood are combined together in order to determine
the posterior probability of h by the Bayes rule:
p(h|X) = p(X|h)p(h)∑
h′inH
p(X|h′)p(h′) (2)
Second, once the posterior probability p(h|X) for all possible
extensions h has been computed by the Bayes Rule, the probability that y
belongs to C is obtained by summing up the probability of all extensions
containing y:
p(y ∈ C|X) = ∑
h:y∈h
p(h|X) (3)
In the hormone level example, if a doctor observes a healthy hormone
level x, and she has to decide if another close-by hormone level y is still
healthy, she first has to infer a probability distribution over the set of
possible extensions of the healthy hormone level. Only then she can
estimate the probability that the new hormone level y is still healthy.
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The computations just defined entail the Numerosity and the
Variability Effects mentioned in the Introduction, that also hold in human
category generalization (Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001). By the
Numerosity Effect, the more examples observed within a range, the lower
the probability of generalization outside that range. This is due to the fact
that by Equation 1 the gap between the likelihood of smaller hypotheses
and the likelihood of larger hypotheses increases exponentially with the
number of examples observed, and by Equations 2 and 3 this gap is
reproduced when generalizing outside the range of the examples. By the
Variability Effect, the higher the variability in the set of observed examples,
the higher the probability of generalization outside their range.
The fact that Bayesian models of category generalization explain
Numerosity and Variability effects in such an elegant way is one of the main
motivations supporting Bayesian analyses of category generalization
(Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001). Indeed, while the two effects also hold in
human categorization, they are not easily captured by alternative theories
of categorization (exemplar and prototype theories, backpropagation-based
neural networks). In the next section we will argue that, on the contrary, a
specific kind of psychologically plausible neural network, namely
self-organizing maps, can account for these phenomena.
For the moment, it is worth re-emphasising that Bayesian models of
cognition are formulated at Marr’s computational level of analysis, and do
not describe a mechanism underlying these computations. Bayesian
cognitive scientists recognize the urgency of establishing a bridge between
Marr’s different levels of analysis, and acknowledge the identification of
psychologically plausible processes underlying Bayesian inferences as a key
challenge in their overall effort to reverse-engineer the human brain. Some
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proposals have been made to provide a mechanistic account of the Bayesian
models of generalization (Sanborn et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2010; Sanborn and
Chater, 2016). In particular, Sanborn et al. (2010) propose Monte Carlo
methods as possible mechanisms underlying Bayesian models. Shi et al.
(2010) propose mechanisms underlying Bayesian models that are based on
exemplar models in which the stored exemplars correspond to hypotheses
rather than stimuli. However, these models lack psychological realism: the
tools they employ, both Monte Carlo methods and stored hypotheses, are
far too complex to account as psychologically plausible mechanisms
(Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001).
Relations between Bayesian approaches and neural networks have
been studied in the past (MacKay, 1995; Neal, 1996; McClelland, 1998).
However, the neural network models considered by these studies suffered
from the criticism raised against neural networks as models on human
category formation: in order to properly categorize and generalize these
neural networks had to be trained with a lot of training examples (rather
than few examples as humans), and with both positive and negative
examples (whereas humans can learn from positive examples only).
Self-organizing map models of categorization
In this section we show that a specific kind of neural network model,
namely self-organizing maps, can provide a plausible description of the
mechanisms underlying category generalization. Self-organizing maps
(SOMs for short) consist of a set of neurons, or units, spatially organized in
a grid (Kohonen et al., 2001).
Each map unit u is associated with a weight vector wu of the same
dimensionality as the input vectors.
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At the beginning, all weight vectors are initialized to random values,
outside the range of values of the input stimuli.
During training, the input elements are sequentially presented to all
neurons of the map. After each presentation of an input x, the
best-matching unit (BMUx) is selected: this is the unit i whose weight
vector wi is closest to the stimulus x (i.e. i = argminj ‖x− wj‖).
The weights of the best matching unit and of its surrounding units
are updated in order to maximize the chances that in the future the same
unit (or the surrounding units) will be selected as the best matching unit
for the same stimulus or for similar stimuli. At iteration n+ 1, the weights
for neuron j are updated as follows:
wj(n+ 1) = wj(n) + η(n)hBMUx,j(n)(x− wj(n)) (4)
where η is the learning rate, and hBMUx,j is the neighborhood function
between the best-matching unit BMUx and j. hBMUx,j(n) is defined as
hBMUx,j(n) = exp
−d2
BMUx,j
2σ(n)2 , where dBMUx,j is the distance between BMUx
and j on the map’s grid, and σ(n) is the width of the gaussian.
This weight change has a twofold effect:
• it reduces the distance between the Best-matching unit (and its
surrounding neurons) and the incoming input, so that in the future
that same unit (and the surrounding ones) will be most likely to be
the best matching unit for the same or similar inputs;
• it organizes the map topologically so that the weights of close-by
neurons are updated in a similar direction, and come to react to
similar inputs.
In our simulations we have used a 3*3 hexagonal SOM trained with
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learning rate 0.5, with neighborhood a gaussian with width 0.5. Each input
stimulus was presented to the SOM once during learning2. With this
training schedule SOMs learn without extensive training, and from positive
examples only.
The learning process is incremental: after the presentation of each
input, the map’s representation of the input (and in particular the
representation of its best-matching unit) is updated in order to take into
account the new incoming stimulus. This can be seen as a plausible
mechanism by which humans form categories: starting from a first stimulus,
that gives rise to a first starting representation, the representation is
updated each time a new stimulus is considered, in order to accommodate
it. The final representation of the stimuli is the result of this iterative
process. At the end of the whole process, the SOM has learned to organize
the stimuli in a topologically significant way: similar inputs (with respect to
Euclidean distance) are mapped to close areas in the map, whereas inputs
which are far apart from each other are mapped to distant areas of the map.
Numerosity and variability effects within self-organizing maps
Do numerosity and variability have an effect on category formation
and generalization within SOMs?
In order to answer the question, we have run three simulations to
investigate how the SOMs’ organization of the input stimuli was affected by
numerosity and variability. In each simulation we have trained the network
with a different set of stimuli. Stimuli are points in a continuous metric
psychological space (e.g., hormone levels) that vary along one dimension (as
2The parameters chosen allow to present to the map the training set few times, in this
case only once. Similar results hold for larger SOMs, with standard parameters settings,
i.e. lower learning rate and hundreds of training epochs.
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for Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). In the first simulation, the Base
Condition, we trained the map with two stimuli: the points [50, 0] and
[60, 0]. In the second simulation we have augmented the number of stimuli
used for training, by keeping the range of values the same as in our Base
Condition. The training stimuli in this simulation, called Numerosity
Condition are the points: [50, 0], [53, 0], [55, 0], [57, 0], [59, 0], [60, 0]. In the
third simulation we have kept the number of stimuli presented to the SOM
for training constant with respect to the Base Condition, while varying the
range of values. In this simulation, our Variability Condition, the stimuli
considered are [30, 0] and [60, 0]3.
After learning is complete, we focus on the category representation
formed by the map out of the examples. We take a minimalist notion of
what is the map’s category representation: this is the ensemble of
best-matching units corresponding to the examples of the category 4. We
will use BMUC to refer to the map’s representation of category C.
To start with, note that both the Variability and the Numerosity
Condition affect the accuracy by which the category examples are
represented by the SOM. In the Numerosity Condition the examples are
represented more accurately than in the Base Condition: the distance
between the map’s category representation and the examples is lower in the
Numerosity Condition than in the Base Condition (Fig. 1). In contrast,
variability leads to a less accurate representation of the examples: in the
Variability Condition the distance between the map’s category
3The stimuli vary in one direction to use the same stimuli as Tenenbaum & Griffiths,
2001. The results would hold also when considering stimuli varying in both directions.
4We could add to the map’s category representation the neurons that are very close to
the best-matching unit, both on the map’s grid and on the input space. The results still
hold.
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representation and the category examples is higher than in the Base
Condition (Fig. 1).
Does this difference in the accuracy of representation of the examples
affect the pattern of generalization of category membership to new stimuli?
The answer is positive. The accuracy of representation of the category
examples sets up a tolerance level, that is then used when making a
generalization judgment. This tolerance level is determined by the
discrepancy between the model’s internal category representation and the
new stimulus.so-called quantization error which is a common and useful
measure of the quality of a map’s representation: for each example x this is
the Euclidean distance of x from its closest neuron( ‖x− wBMUx‖). This
tolerance level, in turn, has a role when judging the significance of the
distance of a new stimulus with respect to the category representation. A
given distance of a new stimulus y from a category representation will seem
more significant if our tolerance level is low: in this case any deviation from
the category representation will be considered significant. In case our
tolerance level is high we will be more tolerant to the same deviation from
category representation, and judge the same distance less significant. This
is formally captured by the notion of relative distance of a new stimulus y
with respect to the representation of a category C (BMUC): this is the
distance of y with respect to the category representation 5, compared with
the distance from the same representation of the category examples6.
min ‖y −BMUC‖
maxx∈C ‖x−BMUx‖ (5)
Using Equation 5 we can define the map’s generalization degree of
5We take the distance from the closest neuron within the map’s category representation
6We take the maximal such error.
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category C membership to a new stimulus y as the inverse of the distance
of y from the category representation.
This measure of the map’s disposition to generalize leads to both
Numerosity and Variability effects. When the number of category examples
within a given range increases, the generalization curve outside that range
shrinks, and the SOM is less likely to attribute to the same category a new
stimulus y outside that range (Fig. 2).
The opposite effect holds when the variability of the category
examples increases: in this case the generalization curve widens, and the
SOM’s disposition to attribute a new stimulus y to the same category
increases (Fig. 2).
Discussion
The results of the previous section show that SOMs can provide a
mechanistic account of the Numerosity Effect as well as of the Variability
Effect observed in human categorization. In contrast to the explanation
advocated on a Bayesian account, the SOM’s explanation of the two effects
relies only on a notion of distance of the new stimulus from the category
representation. As far as we are aware, this is the first quantified argument
demonstrating that the two effects, which characterize human category
generalization, can be explained within the similarity-based paradigm.
Furthermore, SOMs exhibit the two effects when exposed only to few
positive category examples (as in humans), without the need of extensive or
contrastive learning. SOMs results easily extend to stimuli that vary along
more than one dimension, as long as the notion of Euclidean Distance
between stimuli can be clearly defined.
These effects cannot be explained within traditional theories of
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categorization based on similarity, such as the prototype theory (Posner
and Keele, 1968) or the exemplar theory (Medin and Schaffer, 1978;
Nosofsky, 1986). Indeed, for none of these theories does numerosity play a
role: the prototype remains the same independently from the number of
instances considered, and the distance of a new stimulus from the set of
exemplars does not change when the number of exemplars is augmented. In
both theories variability leads to a shift of the generalization curve only in
the direction of variability, but there is no general widening of the
generalization curve.
Numerosity and Variability effects cannot be explained within neural
networks based on backpropagation either, since these networks need
contrastive information in order to achieve a reasonable categorization of
the inputs, whereas in the examples considered here there are only few
positive instances of the category.
Within the exemplar models or combinations of exemplar and neural
network models or related models (Kruschke, 1992; Love et al., 2004), these
effects can be tailored by deliberately letting the attentional weights or the
receptive fields change as a consequence of numerosity or variability of the
examples. But this is an external, ad hoc explanation. On the contrary,
within SOMs the two effects emerge from the SOM learning algorithm,
with no external, ad hoc ingredient.
Could it be that SOMs are an implementation at the algorithmic level
of the Bayesian analyses of category generalization?
It is very difficult to answer this question analytically. This paper
shows that indeed SOMs capture some aspects of Bayesian analyses. Being
psychologically and biologically plausible, this makes SOMs good
candidates to bridge the computational, Bayesian level of analysis and the
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algorithmic level of analysis in the study of category generalization (and
purportedly for other cognitive tasks). However, understanding the exact
extension of this correspondence requires future research.
For the time being we can say that there are small differences between
SOMs and Bayesian analyses predictions. For instance, SOMs are sensitive
to the specific position of repeated category examples within a given range,
whereas Bayesian analyses are not (at least when the size principle is used
as a likelihood estimation, as in Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001). Take the
two following sets of category examples, whose values vary in the same
range but in which the exact values of the instances change: Set 1
= {[30, 0], [40, 0], [60, 0]}; Set 2= {[30, 0], [50, 0], [60, 0]}.
Figure 3 shows that for the Bayesian analysis of categorization in the
two conditions the generalization curve will be the same (Tenenbaum and
Griffiths, 2001). On the contrary, for SOMs there will be a difference in the
generalization curve in the two conditions. This is the consequence of the
fact that SOMs form a representation of the examples, whose position is
shifted depending on the exact values of the category examples. Instead, in
Bayesian models there is no representation being formed, therefore no shift,
and no consequent effect of the exact values of category examples.
Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that a biologically and psychologically
plausible neural network architecture can provide a mechanistic account of
Numerosity and Variability effects usually explained, at the computational
levels, with Bayesian tools. SOMs can do so when exposed to limited
category examples without any need of contrastive information, thus
contradicting the main criticism against models of category generalization
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alternative to the Bayesian ones. We leave for future research the
investigation of the extension of the correspondence between SOMs and
Bayesian models, and whether SOMs can be seen as describing the
mechanisms underlying Bayesian analyses in general.
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           Base Condition     Numerosity Condition                       Variability Condition 
 
Figure 1 . SOM organization in the Base Condition, in the Numerosity
Condition, and in the Variability Condition. Each plot has nine black dots,
one for each neuron of the SOM (plotted with respect to its weights’ values,
on the x−axis the first value, on the y−axis the second value). The grey
lines connect adjacent neurons in the map’s grid. Each plot represents the
neurons’ organization after training with the stimuli in the Base,
Numerosity, and Variability Condition, respectively. Black boxes represent
the stimuli (plotted with the first value on the x−axis, the second value on
the y−axis) in the three conditions. Consider the stimuli best-matching
unit. In all three conditions this is the map’s bottom unit. The maximal
Euclidean distance between the best-matching unit and the stimuli is
higher in the Base Condition than in the Numerosity Condition, whereas it
is lower in the Base Condition than in the Variability Condition.
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Figure 2 . Map’s generalization. On the x−axis the stimuli varying along
that dimension. On the y−axis the corresponding relative-distance
(Equation 5) from the map’s category representation. Left plot: black
dashed curve for the relative-distance in the Base Condition (where black
squares are the examples for this condition), magenta continuous line for
the relative-distance in the Numerosity Condition (where magenta
diamonds are the examples for this condition). The curve in the
Numerosity Condition has lower values than the Base Condition curve,
indicating lower generalization levels. Right plot: Black dashed curve for
the relative-distance in the Base Condition, magenta continuous line for the
relative-distance in the Numerosity Condition. The curve in the Variability
Condition has higher values than the Base Condition curve, indicating
higher generalization levels.
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Figure 3 . On the x−axes the stimuli varying along that dimension. Black
boxes are the examples of Set 1, magenta diamonds are the examples of Set
2. Left plot: on the y−axes the relative-distance (Equation 5) of the stimuli
from the map’s representation of Set 1 (black) and from the map’s
representation of Set 2 (magenta), respectively. Right plot: Probability
(Equation 3) that the corresponding stimuli belong to the same category
than the observed examples of Set 1 (black) and Set 2 (magenta),
respectively.
